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A COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
CHARGES IN CAPE TOWN 
 
Colin Crawford* and Julian C. Juergensmeyer** 
 
During the Study Space IX week in Cape Town, a frequent concern we 
heard expressed by the urban professionals we met was about the city’s need 
for infrastructure improvements. This is of course a common refrain the world 
over,1 although given the rapid urbanization of sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular,2 the need for infrastructure is especially pressing. Moreover, South 
Africa is often a leader on the continent in matters involving spatial planning.3 
Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that South African cities, including Cape Town, 
in recent years have promulgated sophisticated development charge regulations. 
However they are labelled, – development charges, impact fees, impact 
assessments, betterment fees4  – the fact is that conditioning development upon 
a requirement to provide some additional service usually related to the burden 
that will be placed upon the municipality by the development, has become a 
common practice the world over. In addition, more recently other devices have 
become equally popular, notably land value recapture programs.5 As discussed 
below, these may in fact be more promising options for solving Cape Town’s 
infrastructure needs.6 With respect to development charges specifically, 
however, their popularity stems from the fact that they lessen the financing 
                                                     
* Robert C. Cudd Professor of Environmental Law, Tulane University Law School 
** Professor and Ben F. Johnson Jr. Chair in Law, Georgia State University College of Law, 
and Co- Director, Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth 
1 See Crawford, Sześciło & Juergensmeyer. “Social Function and Value Capture: a Role to 
Play in Polish Land Development Regulation?”  Study Space VIII: Phoenix Cities: Urban 
Recovery and Resilience in the Wake of Conflict, Crisis and Disaster, ed. E. Gmurzynska, 62 
Studia Iuridica (2016). 
2 See generally Carlos Nunes Silva, Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Planning Cultures (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
3 We deliberately use the phrase “spatial planning” or “spatial development” here rather than 
the more common term in the U.S., “land use planning”, in light of the negative, apartheid-era 
associations of the latter phrase in South Africa. See Graham & Berrisford, Development 
Charges in South Africa: Current Thinking and Areas of Contestation 
http://www.imesa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Paper-1-Development-charges-in-
South-Africa-Current-thinking-and-areas-of-contestation-Nick-Graham.pdf 
4 See English Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Uthwatt Committee) Final 
Report. Cmd. No. 6386 (1942). 
5 Martim Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for 
Urban Development  (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2013). 
6 See infra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text. 
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burden of the usually cash-short municipality.7 However, as these remarks will 
argue, the appeal of the practice on paper can obscure the actual difficulty of 
collecting the development charges and expending them so as to provide needed 
infrastructure. This challenge is one not lost on South Africans, including Cape 
Town officials and planners.8 
This article, will therefore look at the relatively new Cape Town 
development charge initiative in a comparative perspective.9 Part I will discuss 
the U.S. experience with development charges, including examples both 
effective and less so. The aim in Part I will be to demonstrate the achievements 
and shortcomings of development charges – or impact fees, as they are most 
commonly called in the U.S. – as utilized in the U.S., which was an early adopter 
of such practices globally.10 Part I will also suggest areas in which Cape Town 
practitioners (of whatever kind, whether lawyers, urban planners, engineers and 
so on) might want to take care as they seek to work with their legislation, based 
on the U.S. experience. Part II will then provide an assessment of Cape Town’s 
development charge (DC) efforts in context. Part II also will assess DC efforts 
in Cape Town in comparison with other models, including the U.S. model and 
ask, in light of South African spatial management literature, what, if any, 
concerns stand out for Cape Town’s successful implementation of a DC 
program. Based on the previous two parts, Part III will, finally, briefly conclude 
with some observations and concerns about the practicability of Cape Town 
                                                     
7 Nelson, Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, IMPACT FEES: Principles and Practice of 
Proportionate-Share Development Fees (2009). 
8 Assessing the Fiscal Impacts of Development: Study Report, February 2015, National 
Treasury 
http://sacitiesnetwork.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Fiscal-Impact-of-Development-
Report-Final.pdf 
9  The Cape Town program website is City of Cape Town Development Charges Website 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/work%20and%20business/planning-portal/tariffs-and-
charges/development-charges.  Although we have chosen to concentrate on Cape Town, it 
should be noted that similar programs exist in other South African cities. See for example 
Approval for the City of Tshwane’s Incentive Framework 
http://www.tshwane.gov.za/sites/Council/Council%20Resolutions/98.%20Council%20Resolut
ions%2027%20November%202014/04.%20Approval%20for%20the%20City%20of%20Tshw
ane%20Incentive%20Framework.pdf; Kwadukuza Municipality Draft Policy Regulating the 
Payment & Use of Development Charges May 2015  
http://www.kwadukuza.gov.za/attachments/article/2207/Development%20Charges%20Draft
%20Policy%20IAAP%20May%202015.pdf; Provincial Gazette Igazethi Yephondo 
September 26, 2016 No. 3738 http://code4sa-gazettes.s3.amazonaws.com/archive/ZA-
EC/2016/provincial-gazette-ZA-EC-vol-23-no-3738-dated-2016-09-26.pdf. 
10 Development charges have been used for at least 70 years in the United Kingdom and for 
about 40 years in the United States. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees:  An Answer to 
Local Governmental Capital Funding Dilemma," 9 FLA. STATE UNIV. L. REVIEW 415 
(1981); Malcolm Grant, Compensation and Betterment, in BRITISH PLANNING 62-76 
(1999). 
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achieving significant infrastructure improvements using its new development 
charge regulations. 
 
I. A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH DEVELOPMENT 
CHARGES 
In the 1970’s American local governments began to have shortfalls in 
their infrastructure accounts. New growth was accelerating, thereby increasing 
the need for new infrastructure and, at the same time, the cost of providing 
infrastructure was increasing due to inflation and the public demand for bigger 
and better roads, parks, schools and public buildings. In the decades that 
followed – up to and including the current one - traditional revenue sources 
started stagnating and even disappearing. Property tax revolts begun in 
California spread to other parts of the country and resulted in the inability of 
local government to raise more revenue by raising property taxes. In some 
states, actual caps on property taxes were enacted and in other states political 
rather than legal limitations caused the same result when existing residents 
balked at the idea of their property taxes being spent to build infrastructure for 
new residents. To make matters worse, many federal and state grant programs 
began to dry–up, and as inflation increased, the folly of setting dollar amounts 
rather than percentage amounts of taxes such as the gas tax, led to empty coffers 
for local governments. 
The universal approach to being unable to pay a bill is to look for 
someone else to pay it; the obvious direction for local governments to look was 
to developers. Before the 1970’s were over and at a rapid pace in the years to 
follow, local governments began to require developer contributions toward 
infrastructure costs as preconditions for development approval. The slogan 
“Make Growth Pay for Itself” achieved bumper sticker popularity and thus 
began the era of required developer funding of infrastructure in the United 
States. As discussed above, the United States was by no means the originator of 
developer funding requirements but the speed at which developer infrastructure 
funding requirements spread - was unusual. Today, all fifty states have 
development charges, or impact fees, as they are usually called, in one form or 
another although their scope and amount range from de minimis to quite 
substantial and vary considerably from state to state.11 
The evolution of impact fees has revolved around several key issues: (1) 
What legal authority do local governments (cities and counties, in the US) have 
to impose them?; (2) If there is legal authority, what constitutional standards 
determine their validity or invalidity?; (3) What infrastructure items can be 
financed through them?; (4) How is the amount of the fees determined?; and, 
                                                     
11 A 2015 Survey by Duncan and Associates reports a range of average impact fees per single 
family unit with a high of $23,500 in California to a low of $1,000 in Arkansas. See 
http;//www.impactfees.com  
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finally (5) What limitations cover their expenditure? As we will discuss later, 
most of these issues have relevance to development charges in South Africa. 
A. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
 The first issues confronting a local government in any country which 
wishes to charge impact fees is whether it has the legal authority to do so. Unless 
there is a specific impact fee enabling act or code or a constitutional provision 
on point this can be a troublesome issue and was for many years in most of the 
United States. The first issue raised is whether the fee should be considered a 
tax or a regulatory charge. If it is labelled a tax, which is often the development 
community’s first assertion in opposition,12 then in most jurisdictions world-
wide it may be illegal because local governments usually have limited taxing 
powers. In the United States, state laws and constitutional provisions regarding 
the powers of local governments generally confine local government imposed 
taxes to the property tax and special sales taxes. In those few jurisdictions in the 
United States where the courts recognized that the power of taxation could be 
used to impose development charges, millage or other limits made them 
indefensible or impractical. 
 As a result, in most U.S. states the proponents of impact fees needed for 
the courts to consider them development regulations enacted pursuant to the 
police power – i.e. the power of local governments to promote and protect the 
public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community. In South 
Africa, these challenges have been resolved with authorizing legislation at the 
national and local levels.13 
B. STANDARDS FOR VALIDITY 
If the courts of a jurisdiction without a specific enabling statute or 
constitutional provision accepted the contention that impact fees were 
regulatory in nature and not exercises of the power of taxation, then the next 
exercise became that of identifying the standards to which such land 
development regulations need to be consistent. In U.S. law, the overriding 
                                                     
12  This seems to be the case in South Africa as well.  “Commercial property developers in 
eThekwini have been asked to shell out even more, including a large new development ‘tax – 
a tax that the municipality has ‘invented’ according to property owners who claim it is 
illegal.” Fictitious Tax on Property Developers 
http://www.sacommercialpropnews.co.za/south-africa-provincial-news/kwazulu-natal/3954-
fictitious-tax-on-property-developers.html 
For other developer arguments in opposition, see Amber Dawn Newsletter 21 (Comment from 
property developer to other individuals interested in property development) 
http://www.amberdawn.co.za/site/news/view/16/14/2013/07/03/Amber_Dawn_Newsletter_21
/; Anger Over New Metro Charges (Article discussing Durban developers that, as a result of 
development charges, will go out of business or relocate to ‘friendlier’ municipalities) 
http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/anger-over-new-metro-charges-1178498 
13 See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
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concept is that such police power-based regulations must be reasonable and 
cannot be arbitrary or capricious. Impact fee case law in their early years 
interpreted and applied the reasonableness requirement by adopting the dual 
rational nexus test.  Succinctly stated, Prong One of the test specifies that the 
impact fee charged cannot be greater in amount than the cost to the local 
government of providing the infrastructure for the development from which it 
is collected. Prong Two states that impact fee revenues collected consistently 
with Prong I must be spent for the infrastructure for which it is collected and to 
benefit the development paying the fee. The meaning and ramifications of the 
dual rational nexus test will be discussed more below. South African legislation 
similarly appears to apply a comparable formula,14 although – and predictably 
– the country has experienced developer backlash criticizing the impact fees as 
a stealth form of taxation.15 
C. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR WHICH IMPACT FEES CAN BE COLLECTED 
 Once the legal authority issue is resolved – at least to the satisfaction of 
the local government – the next step is to determine what items of infrastructure 
new growth can developers be required to pay for. In some jurisdictions, the 
question is answered in the state’s impact fee enabling Act. In Georgia, for 
example, the Development Impact Fee Act limits impact fees to the following 
infrastructure items: roads, parks, libraries, water and storm water and sewer 
treatment facilities, and fire and police protection infrastructure16. In Florida, a 
state without a general impact fee enabling statute, the list of eligible facilities 
has been judicially created through litigation and, for example, includes schools. 
In other jurisdictions, the list has been expanded to include environmental 
infrastructure such as open space, aquifer recharge areas, and scenic view 
preservation. In still others, social infrastructure such as affordable housing and 
day care facilities is financed through impact fees. Similarly, yet again, South 
Africa’s list of development charge-related expenditures is limited.17 
D. HOW IS THE AMOUNT OF A FEE DETERMINED? 
 Once the types of infrastructure to be partially or totally financed 
through impact fees is determined, a difficult calculation must be performed to 
determine the amount of the fee.  Prong One of the two-prong rational nexus 
test assumes prime importance by forbidding the local government to charge 
                                                     
14 Id. 
15 See footnote 16 supra and Nick Graham & Stephen Berrisford, Development Charges in 
South Africa: Current Thinking and Areas of Contestation http://www.imesa.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Paper-1-Development-charges-in-South-Africa-Current-thinking-
and-areas-of-contestation-Nick-Graham.pdf. 
16 GA. Code Ann, Sec. 36-71-1 et seq. The most commonly encountered infrastructure item 
not found in the Georgia list is schools. 
17 See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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more than it will cost to provide the infrastructure necessitated by the 
development being charged. This is commonly referred to as the proportionate 
share requirement.  Impact fees that are designed to respect this principle – 
which should be all of them – are often referred to as proportionate share impact 
fees. Note that this does not require local government to charge the full amount 
of its costs but only forbids charging more than that amount. Determining costs 
requires considerable skill, and data and nearly always requires the local 
government to establish levels of service for the infrastructure items. For 
example, X acres of parks per 10,000 residents or roads that provide traffic 
engineers established level of service B. Once again, these are problems that 
South African lawyers and planners are also grappling with.18 
 The most technically difficult task in determining fee amounts relates to 
credits. In impact fee terminology, “credit” has two meanings. The easier is the 
concept of allowing developers with local government approval to build needed 
infrastructure themselves and have the value of what they build “credited” as 
payment of the fees otherwise due. This is common practice and often appeals 
to developers who frequently maintain that they can build infrastructure more 
efficiently than local government. The other and more difficult use of the term 
“credits” refers to the offsets against the fees which represent other ways in 
which the developer will pay for the infrastructure. For example, once the new 
development starts paying property taxes, some of those taxes may be 
designated for infrastructure construction or bond payments for bonds issued to 
raise money to build infrastructure. These calculations are never simple, but to 
ignore them will violate Prong One of the dual rational nexus test, since the 
developer would otherwise be paying twice for the infrastructure.19 
E. LIMITATIONS ON EXPENDITURE OF FEES 
Prong Two of the dual rational nexus test requires that impact fee 
revenues can only be spent for the infrastructure for which it is collected. For 
example, fees collected for roads can only be spent on roads and not on parks, 
and vice versa. Furthermore, the fees must be spent to benefit the fee payor – 
i.e. the new development from which it is collected. This requirement not only 
is designed to guarantee the fairness of the process, but also is used as a way of 
establishing that they are not taxes since no such restraint is placed on the power 
of taxation. One should note that this principle forbids using impact revenues to 
pay for the needs of existing residents and means that if the level of service is 
to be raised, funds must be found outside the impact fee process to pay for the 
share attributable to existing residents. As with so many of the questions 
                                                     
18  Graham & Berrisford, Development Charges in South Africa: Current Thinking and Areas 
of Contestation http://www.imesa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Paper-1-Development-
charges-in-South-Africa-Current-thinking-and-areas-of-contestation-Nick-Graham.pdf. 
19  Nelson, Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, IMPACT FEES: Principles and Practice of 
Proportionate-Share Development Fees (2009). 
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addressed in this section, this is, again, an important part of the calculus in South 
Africa.20 
F. ROLE OF IMPACT FEE ENABLING ACTS 
The easiest way to solve all five issues discussed above is to have an 
Impact Fee Enabling Act. Twenty-six of the United States have legislation in 
regard to impact fees; the most comprehensive ones are the Georgia21 and the 
Texas22 Acts. Many states have adopted one of them in whole or in part. Since 
the authors believe that the Georgia Act is superior to the Texas Act, it will be 
described briefly to examine how it resolves the issues discussed above. 
The Georgia Development Impact Fee Act was originally adopted in 
1990 and legislatively authorizes the adoption of impact programs by Georgia’s 
local governments provided they engage in capital improvement programming. 
It adopts the dual rational nexus concept and emphasizes the proportionate share 
principle. As already mentioned, the statute contains a list of the infrastructure 
items that can be the subject of impact fee programs. Finally, the statute gives 
detailed rules for calculating fees, including credits to be given, and how they 
can be expended. Thus, the Georgia statute neatly limits the role of impact fees, 
provides a clear, principled justification for them and provides precise formulae 
for calculating them. Yet again, the more recent South African legislation does 
the same,23 despite relative neglect by local governments.24 
The above then raises the question: what is the possible relevance of this 
for Cape Town? In Part III below, we will address that question. However, 
before proceeding further, it merits noting – as indicated at the end of many of 
the sub-sections above – that much of what has been said above already 
constitutes a concern that has been addressed or is being addressed in South 
African legislation and in development practice. To some extent, of course, this 
reflects the universality of the difficulties of paying for and providing 
infrastructure services. However, the similarities (indeed, we reflected that we 
could take South African development charge legislation and by changing out 
the name of a South African municipality for a U.S. municipality, the laws were 
virtually interchangeable) also led us to wonder whether development charge 
legislation in South Africa has been sufficiently adapted to the local context. 
That is, for example, it is notable that the legislation does not focus on housing 
provision – treating housing as part of the infrastructure, in a country where a 
huge housing deficit and related service backlog – for reasons related to the 
                                                     
20 See, e.g., infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; see generally Graham & Berrisford, 
supra note 19. 
21 GA. Code Ann, Sec. 36-71-1 et seq. 
22 Tex. Local Gov’t Code Ann., Title 12. Sec. 395.001 et seq. 
23 See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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forced divisions of apartheid. Therefore, in what follows we will consistently 
seek to ask whether South African – and especially Cape Town – development 
charge practice might be tweaked to respond more robustly to local conditions. 
In addition, we will endorse those South African voices suggesting that devices 
other than development charges, such as land value recapture programs, might 
be better in many instances as a means of funding infrastructure in South Africa 
generally and Cape Town specifically. To this end, the next section will review 
features of the Cape Town example. 
 
II. CAPE TOWN AND DEVELOPMENT CHARGES 
To assess the prospects for a successful DC effort in Cape Town, at least 
three matters merit discussion. First, DCs are not new to Cape Town. Some 
form of DC regulation has existed in South Africa since the 1980s.  In fact, 
much earlier than in the United States.25  
However, in the judgment of the National Treasury they have not been 
used “effectively” due to “uncertainty on their legal status, basis of calculation, 
[and] usage of associated revenues.”26 As noted in Part I, these are common 
tensions in the struggle to implement DCs, especially the second and third 
factors.27 Since then, however, the Republic has taken steps both to clarify the 
legal status of DCs and to refine their calculation and application. 
Second, it bears mention that the initial target categories today for DCs 
in South Africa constitute a fairly standard list in global terms, namely potable 
water provision, sewerage collection and treatment, electricity distribution, 
municipal roads and associated infrastructure, and solid waste disposal 
(including landfills and transit stations).28 Moreover, the formula for 
calculation, though not necessarily trouble-free in practice29 (in South Africa or 
anywhere in the world), applies a fairly typical series of considerations as 
follows: “DC is based on the estimated share of the municipal network design 
capacity to be utilised by the developer/applicant; [the] total impact of 
development must be expressed in terms of the unit cost per relevant 
infrastructure unit; and DC quantifies the once-off capital cost of the 
                                                     
25 “In South Africa, municipalities have levied development charges in various forms for 
many years. In the former Cape Province, Betterment Fees were in use from at least 1935, 
based on the percentage of the value of any improvement that was made to a land holding.” 
Davis Savage, “Evaluating the performance of Development Charges in financing municipal 
infrastructure investment,” Discussion Paper (2d draft 23 March 2009). 
26 National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, National Development Charges Policy 
Framework, 9 May 2016, at 6 (presentation on file with author). 
27 See, e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
28 Id. at 10. 
29 See generally Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19. 
8
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol1/iss1/4
8                                   A Comparative Consideration of Development Charges 
 
 16 
infrastructure capacity required by the development.”30 As noted at the end of 
Part I above,31 however, it concerns us that, for example, in the case of Cape 
Town with its unique land use patterns that largely result from historical land 
uses prior to the end of apartheid, that development charges might gain favour 
if the list of permissible uses were adjusted to respond directly to local 
circumstances. 
Thus, on the one hand it is promising that the government is now making 
clear efforts to educate and specify the nature of DCs. However, the fact that 
DCs have existed for some time but have not been widely embraced suggests 
that work will have to be done. Clearly efforts need to continue to be undertaken 
to convince relevant stakeholders that DCs are an important part of the spatial 
management development mix, as government officials argue.32 But signs are 
that this will not be easy. Recent publications on development charges suggest 
that changing attitudes is easier said than done.33 Unsurprisingly, developer 
protest to the DCs, alleging that they are effectively an unfair form of taxation, 
heralded more recent efforts to promote and clarify their use. As noted in Part 
I, this constitutes a standard feature of the DC debate.34 Nonetheless, developers 
are influential players. Getting them on board and convinced of the fairness of 
conditioning development upon DC acceptance is crucial.35 As indicated, it is 
our view that one way to increase their popularity would be to rework the list 
of development charges to recognize legacy land use challenges. Alternately, it 
may be that more aggressive pursuit of other mechanisms, such as land value 
recapture programs, might be time and energy better spent that trying to 
convince developers of the fairness of development charges. 
Third, the legal framework governing the administration of DCs in 
South Africa is complicated. On the one hand, this is a plus because it speaks to 
the fact that DCs have been studied and thought deeply about. On the other 
                                                     
30 Supra note 10 at 11. 
31 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
32 See generally, Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19. 
33 Jugal Mahabir and Ntombizodwa Mabena, Identifying The Funding Constraints In 
Municipal Capital Investments, Chapter 9 in the Technical Report to the Annual Submission 
on the 2015/16 Division of Revenue, Financial and Fiscal Commission, Midrand, South 
Africa 261(2015/16) (“Observing, in relevant part, that development charges “have been 
highly volatile financing sources for municipalities, especially metropolitan municipalities, 
rural municipalities and district municipalities. Possible reasons for this are: the administrative 
complexities embedded in the structure of development charges in South Africa, specifically 
relating to methodologies for costing these charges; legal contestations that have occurred 
between municipalities and developers over levying charges and weak regulatory 
frameworks.”(citation omitted).) 
34 See supra notes 16 and 19 and accompanying text. 
35  Nelson, Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, IMPACT FEES: Principles and Practice of 
Proportionate-Share Development Fees (2009). 
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hand, as will be seen below, this opens the possibility for confusion and 
manipulation of the system. 
The ultimate authority for DCs in South Africa extends from the 
Constitution. Article 152 commands that a municipality must “ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner” and “to promote 
social and economic development.”36 Moreover, a municipality has certain 
“developmental duties,” specifically  to “structure and manage its 
administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the 
basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community” and to participate in national and provincial 
development programmes.”37 This last instruction is especially important as it 
both clarifies the responsibility of municipalities to provide community needs 
and also the requirement to do so within the context of development initiatives 
established by superior levels of government. 
There is yet more relevant legislation. Section 75A of the Municipal 
Systems Act38 “provides the underlying legal basis for a municipality to require 
a DC.” The Act allows municipalities to recover costs associated with municipal 
functions or services, including from third-party actors such as developers. As 
a result, they conclude, Section 75A “thus enables the municipality to enter into 
an agreement with a developer to require the developer to install infrastructure 
to provide or contribute towards providing a service in lieu of having to pay a 
DC.”39 Also important in this connection is the Spatial and Land Use 
Management Act of 2013 (SPLUMA). SPLUMA ambitiously seeks to establish 
uniformity in spatial management throughout the Republic, including 
development of national, regional and municipal levels.40 SPLUMA Section 49 
provides that “[a]n applicant [for development permission] is responsible for 
the provision and installation of internal engineering services” while a 
“municipality is responsible for the provision of external engineering 
services.”41  
However, the omissions in this provision are problematic for 
determining the extent of the DC responsibility. The problem arises from a lack 
of consistency with other planning terminology. Most South African planning 
legislation refers to “bulk” and not “external” services. Graham and Berrisford 
                                                     
36 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), Chapter 7, Art. 152 (b) and (c). 
37 Id. At 153. 
38 Republic of South Africa, Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000. 
39 Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19, discussion of Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act. 
40 Republic of South Africa, Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, Act 16 of 2013, 
Articles 9-11. 
41 Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19, discussion of Section 49. 
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point out that the SPLUMA definition thus omits mention of what are 
commonly called “link” services – that is those services that connect “internal” 
and “external” services. The consequence, they say, is that “SPLUMA 
necessitates a complex, even convoluted, construction in the drafting of 
national, provincial and municipal legislation dealing with engineering 
services.”42 As noted in Part I, impact fee success is demonstrably achieved 
when the covered services are described in detail. This is, for example, a major 
reason for the success of the Georgia Impact Fee Enabling Act.43 
In addition, an applicant need take account of municipal requirements, 
including the provisions of the 2015 Cape Town municipal by-laws44 and more 
recent policy guidance on DCs.45 The policy guidance states the four principles 
that are to govern DC administration in Cape Town, namely (1) equity and 
fairness, (2) predictability, (3) spatial and economic neutrality and (4) 
administrative ease and uniformity.46 That is all very well and good. However, 
in a country as economically and socially unequal as South Africa,47 (1) and 
(3), to cite just one example, present conflict. Equity requires rectifying 
differences of resource distribution – and so would suggest, for example, a 
preference for pursuing DCs in townships and other products of apartheid-era 
spatial management. By contrast, (3) speaks of neutrality, which argues for a 
contrary result, for not giving a preference for any sort of area or economic 
group. It is hard to imagine how they can be reconciled. Graham & Berrisford, 
similarly, express concerns about the predictability factor, noting that “[i]t 
would, however, be unreasonable for poor households to bear these costs [i.e. 
the costs of the related services], which in any event are already subsidised by 
national transfers.” They therefore conclude that, “[i]n order to promote 
predictability and coordination, particularly in low cost housing developments, 
the costs associated with municipal infrastructure (i.e. the development charge) 
should still be established before subsidies are applied in a transparent manner 
to fund the liability.”48 Thus, and consistent with what we have suggested 
                                                     
42 Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19, discussion of Section 49. 
43 See supra note 26. 
44 City of Cape Town Municipal Planning By-Law, 2015, available at 
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/eadp/files/basic-
page/uploads/City%20of%20Cape%20Town.pdf (last accessed April 11, 2017). 
45 City of Cape Town, Development Charges Policy for Engineering Services for the City of 
Cape Town, Policy No: 20037 (Approved by Council 29 May 2014 C 41/05/14). 
46 Id. At 4-5. See also Graham & Berrisford, supra note xx at 4-5 (explaining in greater detail 
what these terms will mean in practice.) 
47 See, e.g., Statistics South Africa, Living Conditions of Households in South Africa, at 15 
(released 11 January 2017)(reporting, for example, that White-headed households earned on 
average 4.5 times more than Black-headed households), available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0310/P03102014.pdf (last accessed April 11, 2017). 
48 Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19, discussion of National Treasury Draft Framework. 
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already, the Cape Town development charges regulation might benefit from 
greater clarity than in our view the four principles (however admirable) provide. 
The U.S. experience, in the success of the impact fee enabling acts, indicates 
that a very specific purpose is best. Given South Africa’s continuing struggles 
with inequality, it might thus be best to focus on equity, and even to privilege 
the use of development charges in particular areas, providing they include 
housing infrastructure. However, as foreign observers, we recognize that the 
choice should be a domestic one.  
In other words, this is to say that the fact of South Africa’s huge income 
inequality creates enormous concerns about the practical application of the 
existing DC rules. Perhaps partly for this reason, the Western Cape government 
has expressed concerns about the usefulness of DCs and their negative effects 
on housing affordability,49 favouring instead public-private partnerships for 
purposes of housing developments, despite their cumbersome nature.50 
Although of course DCs are not only used in the housing context, this is no 
small concern in South Africa, where the housing deficit, and associated service 
deficit, is considerable.51 Typically, low-cost housing, which in South Africa is 
categorized as “social” and not “economic” infrastructure, is not funded by 
DCs.52 However, given the chronic shortage of capital for all infrastructure, 
there is no reason in theory that this should not happen.53 Nonetheless, if this 
were to happen there would arise serious challenges of how to off-set the DCs 
attributable to “social” infrastructure.54 In addition, it would be essential to 
promote a high degree of transparency so that “unscrupulous developers” do 
not inflate “the costs of the infrastructure that they have installed in order to set 
off a greater amount against their overall development charges liability.”55 In a 
region where spatial management activities have long been beset by a lack of 
transparency and associated corruption,56 this may be no easy task. 
In sum, the successful implementation of DCs in South Africa is 
                                                     
49 F. Cuming, Western Cape Government Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning, Development charges and housing affordability: A policy conundrum 
35 (2013). 
50 Id. At 41-42 
51 Presentation of Gareth Haysom to Study Space Cape Town, Thursday, June 30, 2016 (notes 
on file with authors). 
52 Graham and Berrisford, supra note 19. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Stephen Berrisford, Why It Is Difficult to Change Urban Planning Laws in 
African Countries, 22 Urb. Forum 209, pp. 217-225 (2011), available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12132-011-9121-1 (last accessed April 11, 
2017)(observations by a South African discussing Sub-Saharan African generally). 
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especially challenging given the country’s history and current context. We note 
only the following matters, the resolution of each of which will affect the more 
widespread use of DCs in the country: 
1) Service backlog created by decades of apartheid-era inequity and 
neglect of service provision. As suggested above,57 however, this creates 
something of a chicken-or-egg problem with DCs. On the one hand, 
local governments are constitutionally mandated to provide 
infrastructure,58 and special attention is given to the provision of 
inclusionary and affordable housing. Yet as noted above, housing is 
considered a “social” infrastructure obligation and so outside of the 
ambit of activities traditionally financed by DCs. Thus, a practice gap 
needs to be filled to make this possible without passing on costs to the 
poorest South Africans. At the same time, a generation of construction 
of housing at no cost to the inhabitant, and sometimes of uncharged 
services, has created an expectation in some quarters of “free” 
services.”59 Clearly, part of making DCs a more viable option requires 
not just educating on DCs but on changing the understanding of how 
municipal services overall are paid for and used. 
2) South Africa may have outstanding spatial management legislation but, 
like most sub-Saharan countries, it lacks an abundance of well-trained 
spatial management professionals equipped to handle the volume of 
development activity.60 DC regulations and processes are by their nature 
complicated and the questions of valuation and duration are not always 
easily resolved.61 Thus, the need to increase spatial management 
professional capacity must be understood as part and parcel of the 
process of creating more widespread acceptance of and adoption of DCs 
as a municipal service financing option. 
3) Differences of terminology need to be resolved in the relevant 
legislation and regulations. This is equally true for conflicts between 
laws, as in the conflict, noted above, between “bulk” services in one law 
and “external” services in the other and for conflict within legal 
instruments, just as the Cape Town policy guidance’s contradictory 
principles. 
4) In addition, some outside observers, and notably the World Bank,62 
                                                     
57 Supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. 
58 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
59 Such as the provision of full subsidized housing units. Presentation of Tristan Görgens 
(Western Cape Government) to the Study Space IX seminar, July 1, 2016. 
60 See Berrisford, supra note 64, at 19. 
61 See supra notes 23-25b and accompanying text. 
62 World Bank, Evaluating the performance of Development Charges in financing municipal 
infrastructure investment (Discussion Paper – Second Draft 23 March 2009), available at 
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argue that additional legal instruments and guidance are needed to make 
DCs a robust part of the municipal service financing mix. 
5) While developer protests are commonly loud in opposition to DCs, they 
must be a special focus of education efforts, to change the normative 
expectation of who has responsibility for service provision, and when. 
 
III. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS GOING AHEAD 
What lessons do the foregoing comments summarizing key U.S. 
experiences with DCs hold for South Africa and Cape Town? First, and to 
emphasize a point made above, the laws and regulations, at both the national 
and local levels, would benefit from being as specific as possible, as to both 
purpose and implementation. We also note an added benefit of greater 
specificity, namely the possibility of promoting the highest level of 
transparency.63 Second, we suggest it is worth rethinking the areas in which 
development charges should be applied, to respond directly to the most 
pressing South African social and economic issues as they manifest 
themselves in spatial use. We acknowledge, of course, that this could entail 
legislative and even constitutional changes (e.g. for the funding of “social” 
expenditures) that may be more easily suggested than accomplished. Third, 
and relatedly, there may be ways to make the development charges more 
appealing to developers and other stakeholders who would use and benefit 
from them if other measures, such as “green offsets” that would encourage 
energy-savings, as part of the applicable regulatory structure.64 Finally, and 
as also touched on above, it may simply be that development charges are 
not the best vehicle for promoting infrastructure provision in a society 
deeply unequal and with a relatively small private development sector.65 For 
this reason, other measures also mentioned above, from public-private 
partnerships to land value recapture programs, may hold greater promise in 
Cape Town specifically and in South Africa more broadly in the unending 
search for the best means to finance infrastructure in a world where – almost 
no matter where you are – municipal finances are reduced. 
                                                     
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHAFRICA/Resources/Development_Charges-
Draft_2-23_March_09.pdf (last accessed April 11, 2017).  
63 See, e.g., Berrisford, supra note 64, at 223. See also Graham and Berrisford, supra note 19 
(citing concerns aout corruption in section on “Thresholds and exemptions.”). 
64 Graham & Berrisford, supra note 19, discussion of Discounts for ‘green’ infrastructure. 
65 Stuart Paul Denoon-Stevens, Developing an appropriate land use methodology to promote 
spatially just, formal retail areas in developing countries: The case of the City of Cape Town, 
South Africa, 54 Land Use Policy 19-20 (2016). 
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